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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between corporate governance and
firm value at different stages of the corporate life-cycle.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors use twomeasures, commonly employed in the literature,
to differentiate between “immature” and “mature” firms, and estimate separate governance-value regressions
for each set of firms.
Findings – The findings suggest that it is differences in the resource/strategic governance functions,
which manifest in young firms which result in differences in value across firms, all else equal.
The authors find no relationship between governance and firm value for older firms. Hence, differences
in the monitoring aspect of governance between mature firms are not rewarded with a value premium.
Research limitations/implications – The findings imply that the strategic and resource roles of
governance are “must haves” for firms since firms that score highly on these fronts are valued more
highly. In contrast, differences in the monitoring aspect of governance are not rewarded, suggesting
that effective monitoring is not a necessity, but rather a “nice to have”. The analysis is limited to a
small sample of emerging market firms, and it would be of interest to extend this analysis to a larger
and broader sample of firms.
Originality/value – The findings suggest that corporate governance is not valued at all stages of the
corporate life-cycle.
Keywords Corporate governance, Firm value, Emerging markets, Corporate life-cycle
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
A central issue in empirical corporate governance studies concerns the relationship
between corporate governance and firm value. The collective literature to date points
to a positive causal relationship between corporate governance and firm value (see
Bebchuk et al., 2009; Black et al., 2012, 2015). Better-governed firms are valued more
highly than poorly governed firms, and (voluntary) governance improvements tend to
cause (positive) changes in value (see Black et al., 2015; Morey et al., 2009; Chhaochharia and
Laeven, 2009)[1]. Closely related to these governance-value studies are governance-prediction
studies (see Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Black et al., 2006a; Doidge
et al., 2007 to name but a few). These studies seek to identify the firm, industry, and
country-level factors, which at a particular point in time, explain differences in corporate
governance quality between firms. Braga-Alves and Morey (2012) provide an exception.
They examine how a change in firm/institutional characteristics predicts changes in
governance.
In the most recent governance-prediction literature, the emphasis has shifted towards
an examination of the dynamic nature of the principal-agent relationship by exploring
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how corporate governance quality changes within-firms over the corporate life-cycle (see
Filatotchev et al., 2006; O’Connor and Byrne, 2015). While neither study can draw on
longitudinal governance data in order to track governance changes within-firms, their
analysis suggests that firms voluntarily alter their governance practices over their life-
time. Filatotchev et al. (2006) point to the fact that the corporate governance function is
multi-faceted, and serves a strategic, resource, and control/monitoring roles in firms, and
since these functions are required by firms at different life-cycle stages, governance
changes along the firm life-cycle (see also McCahery and Vermuelen, 2014). O’Connor and
Byrne (2015) build on the work of Filatotchev et al. (2006). They augment a standard
governance-prediction model with proxies for a firm’s life-cycle and show that corporate
governance quality is not static, but actually improves along the corporate life-cycle[2].
Their work suggests that “mature” firms are better governed overall than their
“immature” counterparts[3].
While the relationship between corporate governance and firm value has attracted
much attention, what has attracted little or no attention is when the “governance
premium” manifests. This is surprising since theory says that it is the strategic/
resource roles of governance which create value for firms, while it is the role of the
control/monitoring function to preserve this value (see Filatotchev et al., 2006). In this
paper, we examine how the relationship between corporate governance and firm value
differs along the corporate life-cycle for a sample of emerging market firms. We do so
because, while there is evidence which suggests that governance is valuable at different
life-cycle stages, it is not so obvious in which life-cycle stage governance is the most
valuable. On the one hand, a traditional and narrow-view of governance would suggest
that the “governance premium” is attributable to differences in the monitoring function
of governance alone across firms. Jensen’s (1986, 1993) free-cash flow hypothesis
suggests that the real value of corporate governance to the firm lies in the monitoring
and control functions that governance provides (see Filatotchev et al., 2006). The central
premise of Jensen’s (1986, 1993) argument is that corporate governance is designed to
address “agency problems” between shareholders and managers (i.e. the principal-agent
perspective) or minority and majority (controlling) shareholders (i.e. the principal-principal
perspective), and since agency conflicts are most severe when firms are mature, then
governance which serves to reduce the “agency costs of free cash flow”will be more highly
valued when firms are mature[4]. However, this view is problematic on at least two fronts.
First, the focus is too narrow and excludes the resource/strategic governance functions.
The resource/strategic governance functions are of particular importance for young
fast-growing firms, while the preservation of firm value created by the resource/strategic
functions, achieved through effective monitoring, is more important for older more mature
firms. Under the resource/strategic view, it is not necessarily the independence of the board
that matters, but rather its composition. For example, young firms benefit from appointing
external directors to the board with considerable business and finance expertise (see
Filatotchev et al., 2006). Second, companies like Apple and Walmart continue to flourish,
while at the same time the independence of the board of directors at both firms has been
the subject of much criticism (see Kane and Lubin, 2010; Satariano, 2014). The fact that
Apple (and some other firms) continues to attract the support of shareholders, while at the
same time adopting an atypical corporate governance monitoring function potentially has
some important implications for the relationship between corporate governance practices
and firm value. The most obvious implication, and the one most relevant for the purposes
of this paper is that not all governance functions matter for firm value, and some, say
board independence for example, may be perceived more as a “nice-to-have” rather than a
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“must-have”[5]. However, at the same time there is ample evidence to suggest that a
“governance premium” exists, which suggests that some aspects of governance are
“must-haves”. Therefore, by examining the relationship between corporate governance
and firm value for mature and immature firms alike, we can gain an insight into how
important the resource and strategic vis-à-vis the monitoring functions are for firm value.
Hence, in this paper, we seek to separate the “nice to haves” from the “must haves”
by examining how the relationship between corporate governance and firm value
differs along the corporate life-cycle for a sample of emerging market firms. To do so,
we perform a governance-value study using two years of Credit Lyonnais Securities
Asia (CLSA) corporate governance data for a sample of 225 emerging market firms.
We focus on the emergingmarket firms covered by CLSA for two reasons. First, we require
a governance measure whose coverage is broad enough to capture the strategic, resource
and monitoring roles of governance. CLSA governance data does just that as it covers
broad aspects of governance (e.g. transparency, independence, accountability). Much
work which examines corporate governance for US firms employ either the G-Index of
Gompers et al. (2003) or the E-Index of Bebchuk et al. (2009), neither of which would be
suitable for the purpose of this paper because in both cases each governance measure is
too narrow in its focus. Second and also using CLSA data, O’Connor and Byrne (2015)
establish that different governance functions are prominent at different life-cycle stages.
The governance functions which perform a strategic and resource role are prominent in
younger firms, while aspects of governance which monitor managerial behaviour are
largely evident in older more mature firms. We extend the work of O’Connor and Byrne
(2015) and examine whether it is the monitoring or resource/strategic or perhaps even
both functions of governance which matter for firm value. Our findings suggest that it is
the resource/strategic governance functions that are rewarded, but not the monitoring
function. The resource/strategic functions of governance appear to be “must-haves” since
they are rewarded, while the monitoring function does not appear to be a necessity but
a “nice to have”.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the data. Section 3 discusses
our main findings, while Section 4 concludes.
2. Data
We use the corporate governance scores developed by CLSA (see Gill, 2001, 2002)[6].
The CLSA governance ratings range from a low of 0 to a high of 100 with higher values
suggesting better quality corporate governance. The ratings are calculated for each of
the firms in 2001 and 2002. The rating for each individual firm, for which there is 495
in total across 25 countries, is a composite measure of 57 qualitative, binary questions
which span seven distinct governance categories, namely management discipline,
transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness, and social awareness.
The first six governance provisions have a 15 per cent weighting in the overall index,
while social awareness has a 10 per cent weighting.
We use Tobin’s q to proxy for firm value (Klapper and Love, 2004; Chi, 2005; Black
et al., 2006, 2012, 2015) all use Tobin’s q to proxy for firm value in governance-value
studies; Doidge et al. (2004, 2009) do so in cross-listing studies; and Mitton and
O’Connor, 2012 in a stock market liberalization study). Tobin’s q is defined as the book
value of debt plus market capitalization divided by the book value of assets[7].
We control for a number of determinants of firm value (and corporate governance).
These include firm size, growth, profitability, leverage, asset tangibility, and whether
the firm is cross-listed in the USA or not in 2001 and 2002. All firm-level variables are
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sourced from Worldscope and a description of how each is measured is presented in
Appendix 1. Appendix 1 also reports some summary statistics for each variable.
All information on US cross-listings is sourced from the Bank of New York-Mellon
(www.adrbnymellon.com), and cross-referenced with data from Citibank (wwss.citissb.
com/adr) and JP Morgan (www.adr.com), the New York Stock Exchange (www.nyse.
com), and the NASDAQ (www.nasdaq.com) to ensure that we classify firms according
to their correct cross-listing status as of 2001 and 2002. We group all cross-listing firms
together, rather than differentiate by cross-listing type (i.e. Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, and
Rule 144a American Depositary Receipts (ADR)). In all, 75 out of our total number of
225 firms are cross-listed in the USA in 2001 and 2002[8].
The final sample is presented in Table I. There are 225 firms in total across 18 countries,
namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and
Turkey. The number of sample firms provided by each country varies greatly with India
(41), Taiwan (26), and Hong Kong (26) providing the greatest numbers, while Argentina,
Colombia, and Hungary, provide just one firm each. Each firm is available in both sample
years which results in a final sample with 450 firm-year observations. Columns 3 through 6
present the median and standard deviation corporate governance in 2001 and 2002.
They reveal a number of important features of corporate governance quality already
documented in the literature to date. First, there exists sizeable differences in corporate
governance quality across and within-countries (see also Klapper and Love, 2004).
The CLSA data says that firms are best-governed in South Africa (the average of 2001 and
2002 median governance is 78.60) and Singapore (66.18), and poorly governed in Indonesia
(36.60). The large standard deviations say that not all firms in China are poorly governed,
while not all firms in South Africa are as well-governed as the median firm. Second,
between 2001 and 2002, the governance practices of the median firm increased, in among
others, Korea (change is 12.10), India (5.50), Taiwan (5.65), and Thailand (3.80). In contrast,
governance quality has fallen in Argentina (14.10), Brazil (13.70), and Colombia (6.50)[9].
The remaining columns of Table I present summary measures for Tobin’s q and our
two corporate life-cycle variables, namely, the ratio of retained equity to total assets
and dividend payout. Dividend payout is measured as dividends to assets. The median
firm is most highly valued in India (Tobin’s q is 2.03), Turkey (1.91) and Taiwan (1.65).
The sole firms in Argentina (0.99) and Colombia (0.93) are lowly valued. Mature firms
are evident in South Africa (both ratio of retained equity to total assets and dividend
payout are high).
3. Results and discussion
We begin by examining the relationship between firm value and corporate governance
by estimating pooled ordinary least squares, firm fixed effects, and random effects
regressions. We use firm and random effects to account for the unobserved heterogeneity
that pooled ordinary least squares regressions do not account for. We report coefficient
estimates from random effects regressions because of concerns that our governance
variable changes little within-firms between 2001 and 2002. The primary shortcoming
of using random effects is that the random effects specification assumes that the
unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with all right-hand side variables. In the
firm-fixed and random effects regressions, we find that White (1980) and clustered (by
firm) standard errors are broadly similar, and our main conclusions remain qualitatively
the same assuming White (1980) and clustered (by firm) standard errors. This is not
surprising since our panel is short, and thus the firm effect is less likely to decay and
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Sample description
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remain (almost) fixed, and is thus largely captured using the firm fixed (and random)
effects (see Petersen, 2009 for a discussion). In the pooled ordinary least squares
regressions, the standard errors are clustered by firm. In all regressions we include a time
(year) dummy for 2002[10].
We use an extensive set of control variables commonly used in the literature, namely,
firm size, growth opportunities, the ratio of EBIT/Assets, the ratio of net income/assets,
leverage, the ratio of PPE/Sales, and whether a firm is cross-listed on the USA or not.
Our 75 cross-listed firms are cross-listed in both 2001 and 2002. Consequently, the
cross-listing variable is excluded from the fixed-effects regressions because it has no
within-firm variation.
The results from the pooled, random, and fixed-effects regressions are presented in
Table II. They suggest a positive relationship between firm value and corporate
governance. The coefficient estimates for corporate governance are positive and
significant in all but one regression. The coefficient estimates range from 0.004 to 0.027,
depending on the specification used, implying than an improvement in corporate
governance leads to an increase in firm value. With respect to the control variables, and
like Black et al. (2015), we find that both the ratio of net income/total assets and leverage
are positively and significantly related to firm value. The ratio of net income/assets is an
indicator of profitability and a higher value implies a higher efficiency in utilizing
a firm’s asset base. The positive relationship observed between leverage and firm
value is unsurprising because leverage provides tax shields and serves to reduce
the free-cash flow problem, thus enhancing firm value. We find a negative
POLS Fixed effects Random effects
Corporate governance 0.027 (3.59)*** 0.004 (0.80) 0.013 (2.56)***
Size −0.183 (1.15) −2.277 (3.41)*** −0.325 (1.85)*
Growth −0.428 (1.81)* 0.017 (0.11) −0.387 (2.52)**
EBIT/assets 0.726 (0.40) −1.940 (1.23) −0.466 (0.31)
Net income/assets 6.999 (3.09)*** 6.001 (2.5)** 5.829 (2.79)***
Leverage 0.496 (1.30) 2.004 (2.43)** 0.736 (1.73)*
PPE/sales −0.037 (0.73) −0.107 (2.29)** −0.103 (2.68)***
US cross-listing 0.050 (0.33) 0.109 (0.51)
Industry dummies Included Excluded Included
Country dummies Included Excluded Included
Time dummy Included Included Included
No. observations 450 450 450
R2 0.530 0.181 0.499
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates from pooled ordinary least squares (POLS), firm fixed
and random effects regressions, with robust t-statistics. The t-statistics are calculated using standard
errors clustered by firm. The sample period is for the years 2001 and 2002. The dependent variable is
Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q is calculated as the book value of debt plus market capitalization divided by the
book value of assets. Corporate governance measures are from CLSA, and are calculated as an equally
weighted average of discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness,
and social responsibility. All other variables are defined in the main text. All firm-level data is sourced
from Worldscope and information on firms cross-listing in the USA from Bank of New York-Mellon
(www.adrbnymellon.com), and cross-referenced with data from Citibank (wwss.citissb.com/adr) and JP
Morgan (www.adr.com), the New York Stock Exchange (www.nyse.com), and the NASDAQ (www.
nasdaq.com). A full set of industry, country, and time dummies are included where indicated but not
reported. *,**,***Significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively
Table II.
Regression estimates
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(sometimes significant) relationship between firm size and firm value, capturing
the small firm effect. The relationship between growth and firm value and EBIT/Assets
and firm value is ambiguous, while the effect of cross-listing in the USA on firm value is
positive but insignificant[11]. Finally, like Lehn et al. (2009), but not Black et al. (2012), we
find that PPE/Sales is negatively related to firm value.
Next, we attempt to identify at what stage of the corporate life-cycle is governance
most important for firm value. We begin by dividing our sample into immature and
mature firms, respectively. We use two measures to proxy for the maturity of a firm.
First we use corporate dividend payout; the assumption being that mature firms pay
larger dividends (see DeAngelo et al., 2006; Bulan and Subramanian, 2009)[12].
Previous evidence suggests that firms that are at the growth stage of their life-cycle
tend to have lower dividend ratios (see Anthony and Ramesh, 1992). Shareholders
will consent to lower dividends from less mature firms that have greater growth
opportunities because by investing in these profitable growth opportunities, firms
will increase the value of the firm, thus increasing shareholder wealth. Conversely, at
the mature stage of their life-cycle, as growth opportunities decrease, firms have less
profitable investment opportunities and so, are more likely to initiate and continue to
pay dividends[13].
The second measure we use to proxy for firm maturity is the ratio of retained
equity to total assets, a measure that has been used extensively in the dividend
literature (see DeAngelo et al., 2006; Denis and Osobov, 2008; Brockman and Unlu,
2011). DeAngelo et al. (2006), Denis and Osobov (2008), and Brockman and Unlu
(2011) all show that dividend payout increases in the ratio of retained equity to total
assets. As firms mature, the contribution of earned equity (relative to contributed
equity) to total equity (and total assets) increases, since firms become more profitable
and have a reduced investment opportunity set, reducing the need for external
(contributed) capital, which ultimately results in free cash flow. Mature (immature)
firms are characterized with high (low) ratios of dividend payout and retained equity
to total assets, respectively[14].
In the first panel of Table III, mature firms (96 firms in total) are those whose ratio of
retained equity to total assets is greater than the median ratio of retained equity to total
assets. Immature firms (106 firms) are those whose ratio of retained equity to total
assets is less than the sample median. In the second panel of Table III, and to account
for differences in dividend payout across industries, mature firms (110 firms) are those
whose dividend payout is greater than the median industry payout, while immature
firms (115 firms) are those where dividend payout is less than the median industry
payout[15].
We re-run our analysis with the sample separated into mature and immature firms
and some interesting observations emerge. Coefficient estimates from firm fixed-effects
(random effects) are outlined in the top (bottom) panels of Table III. The coefficient
estimates on corporate governance for immature firms are higher than those on mature
firms, and is statistically significant regardless of which measure is used to proxy for
firm maturity. The coefficient estimates on corporate governance for mature firms are
negative and insignificant in the firm fixed-effects regressions, and positive but
statistically insignificant in the random effects regressions. In contrast, when we
concentrate only on firms at early life-cycle stages, the coefficient estimates are positive
and statistically significant in all four instances, ranging from 0.01 (t is 1.70*) to 0.02
(t is 1.92*). We interpret this finding in the following way. Corporate governance is
more important to firms that are at the earlier phase of the corporate life-cycle[16].
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Along the corporate life-cycle, firms will have different financing requirements. Firms
with good growth opportunities are more likely to require external financing to pursue
those opportunities and hence may find it optimal to improve corporate governance.
Firms with access to profitable growth opportunities are typically younger firms at
earlier stages of the life-cycle. Immature firms will need to mobilize capital and allocate
this capital to profitable investment opportunities. In order to raise external finance at
as low a cost as possible, the strategic and resource allocation roles of corporate
Dividend payout Retained equity to total assets
Above median
industry payout
Below median
industry payout Above median Below median
Fixed effects
Corporate governance −0.011 (1.71)* 0.020 (1.92)* −0.005 (0.74) 0.010 (1.70)*
Size −3.081 (2.22)** −2.660 (4.55)*** −2.546 (1.59) −2.439 (3.71)***
Growth 0.423 (1.50) 0.095 (0.50) −0.362 (1.05) 0.443 (2.86)***
EBIT/assets −3.886 (2.67)*** −2.897 (1.20) −4.136 (1.51) −0.283 (0.18)
Net income/assets 11.098 (3.68)*** 6.684 (2.11)** 8.245 (2.17)** 3.140 (1.38)
Leverage 3.568 (2.49)** 1.500 (1.38) 0.979 (0.62) 3.719 (3.34)***
PPE/sales −0.150 (0.92) −0.067 (1.28) 0.012 (0.16) −0.234 (2.48)**
US cross-listing
Industry dummies Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded
Country dummies Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded
Time dummy Included Included Included Included
No. Observations 221 229 192 212
R2 0.199 0.135 0.158 0.090
Random effects
Corporate governance 0.006 (0.76) 0.018 (1.99)** 0.006 (0.88) 0.015 (2.11)**
Size −0.487 (2.39)** −0.017 (0.11) −0.258 (1.27) −0.265 (1.19)
Growth −0.146 (0.55) −0.445 (1.95)* −0.788 (2.35)** −0.052 (0.32)
EBIT/assets −0.417 (0.20) −1.728 (1.09) −1.723 (0.76) 0.652 (0.41)
Net income/assets 9.206 (2.69)*** 5.704 (3.30)*** 8.181 (2.19)** 2.088 (1.01)
Leverage 1.153 (1.71)* 0.321 (0.70) −0.075 (0.09) 0.967 (1.61)
PPE/sales −0.109 (1.55) −0.081 (2.00)** −0.059 (0.93) −0.154 (1.97)**
US cross-listing 0.091 (0.34) 0.157 (0.75) −0.245 (1.00) 0.077 (0.29)
Industry dummies Included Included Excluded Excluded
Country dummies Included Included Excluded Excluded
Time dummy Included Included Included Included
No. Observations 221 229 192 212
R2 0.575 0.508 0.578 0.423
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates from firm fixed and random effects regressions, with
t-statistics robust to firm-level clustering. The sample period is for the years 2001 and 2002. Separate
regressions are estimated by level of retained equity to total asset and dividend payout, respectively.
The dependent variable is Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q is calculated as the book value of debt plus market
capitalization divided by the book value of assets. Corporate governance measures are from CLSA, and
are calculated as an equally weighted average of discipline, transparency, independence, accountability,
responsibility, fairness, and social responsibility. All other variables are defined in the main text. All
firm-level data are sourced fromWorldscope and information on firms cross-listing in the USA from Bank of
New York-Mellon (www.adrbnymellon.com), and cross-referenced with data from Citibank (wwss.citissb.
com/adr) and JPMorgan (www.adr.com), the NewYork Stock Exchange (www.nyse.com), and the NASDAQ
(www.nasdaq.com). A full set of industry, country, and time dummies are included where indicated but not
reported. *,**,***Significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively
Table III.
Regression estimates
by life-cycle stage
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governance are the most important (see Filatotchev et al., 2006). Establishing property
rights and maintaining reliable and transparent accounts will be crucial to investors so
it is of critical importance that corporate governance is focused on these functions.
Furthermore, Francis et al. (2012) show that better governed emerging market firms
can obtain bank loans from a wider variety of lenders at a lower rate of interest and
with a longer maturity date.
Using a number of different life-cycle proxies, O’Connor and Byrne (2015) show that
governance quality, and most notably, board independence is greatest for mature firms.
The independence measure quantifies the extent to which the board of directors is
independent from the controlling shareholder/manager, and thus better able to monitor
their activities. Using a number of agency cost proxies, which arguably could be
employed as life-cycle measures, Dey (2008) reaches similar conclusions in that
certain monitoring functions of governance are greatest in firms with the most severe
agency costs. Hence, at the latter stages of the corporate life-cycle, effective monitoring
becomes a priority.
Previous studies have shown it is the monitoring role as opposed to the strategic and
resource roles of governance that is most relevant for mature firms (see Filatotchev
et al., 2006; O’Connor and Byrne, 2015). Our findings suggest that it is the strategic
and resource functions of corporate governance, which is the most prominent role of
governance in immature firms, which matters most for firm value. Differences
in the strategic and resource roles of governance, which are dominant when firms are
immature result in value differences between firms. It appears that, at the latter stages
of the corporate life-cycle, better monitoring is not rewarded through higher firm value.
These findings suggest that shareholders do not necessarily view effective monitoring
as a “must-have” but rather a “nice to have” since differences in the monitoring function
across firms do not result in differences in firm value, all else equal. In contrast,
differences in the strategic/resource functions are rewarded with higher firm values,
suggesting that these governance functions are “must haves”. It would appear that
firm growth, and the governance functions which promote growth are rewarded by
shareholders (McCahery and Vermuelen, 2014).
In Table IV we explore whether the conclusions drawn from Table III are robust to a
series of additional tests. In particular, we examine whether our findings are robust to:
(1) alternative classification of mature and immature firms, (2) controlling for the
agency substitution model of dividends, (3) the use of an alternative life-cycle measure,
and finally (4), the use of an alternative measure of firm value, namely the market to
book of assets. First, in relation to (1), we account for differences in dividend payout
(and RE/TA) across countries and industries, and now classify firms as mature
(immature) if their dividend payout (RE/TA) is greater (less) than the industry and
country-adjusted sample median. Our findings remain qualitatively the same when we
perform such an exercise (see columns labelled “industry and country adjusted
dividend payout” and “industry and country adjusted RE/TA”)[17]. Our second
robustness test concerns the agency substitution model of dividends (see La Porta et al.,
2000). The agency substitution model of dividends says that firms with abundant
growth opportunities can substitute poor country-level investor protection with
reputational capital by establishing a dividend payment history (see Gan et al., 2013).
The implication is that young, growth firms pay large dividends. This finding has
important implications for our paper since we designate high dividend-paying firms as
mature, and as a consequence we may erroneously classify young high dividend-
paying firms as mature and not immature as they undoubtedly are. To address this
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Table IV.
Robustness tests
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potential shortcoming, we classify mature (immature) firms as those with above
(below)-median retained equity to total assets and dividend payout (see column labelled
“industry and country adjusted dividend and RE/TA”). Young reputational building
firms pay large dividends but are immature and thus have low (and potentially
negative) retained equity to total assets. When we classify firms according
to this criterion, we lose some firms as there are young firms (i.e. below-median RE/
TA) that pay large dividends, yet our conclusions remain the same as before. Third, we
use cash holdings (cash to assets) as an alternative life-cycle proxy. Mature firms are
those with above industry and country-adjusted cash holdings. Using cash holdings,
our findings are not as conclusive as those reported in Table III and the early columns
of Table IV, since in the random effects regressions; the coefficient estimates on the
governance variable are positive, statistically significant, but not larger for mature
firms[18]. Finally, in the remaining columns of Table IV, we use market to book of assets
in place of Tobin’s q. Our conclusions are generally the same when we use market to
book of assets to measure firm value. Interestingly, in the firm fixed-effects regressions,
governance is value destroying for mature firms. Black et al. (2012) show that in some
countries (e.g. Brazil) individual governance functions (e.g. board structure) can destroy
firm value.
4. Conclusion
The most recent work in governance-value studies suggest that, what are perceived to
be “best” governance practices are not necessarily beneficial (value-enhancing) for all
firms (see Black et al., 2015). What actually matters in corporate governance does not
universally “fit-all”, but is dependent on the culture and institutional setting in each
individual country. Thus, firms tailor their governance needs to best suit the cultural
and institutional setting that they find themselves domiciled in. For example, Griffin
et al. (2013) show that using stock market based corporate governance scores, where
traditionally there is a premium placed on the governance attributes of transparency,
monitoring, and disclosure, firms in collectivist cultures score lowly, at least when
compared to their counterparts in individualistic cultures. These findings do not
necessarily say that firms in collectivist societies are poorly governed. Rather, they say
that the governance attributes, which are valued in individualistic societies, are not so
highly valued in collectivist societies, where close ties among corporate stakeholders
render such governance functions less relevant.
Recent work also suggests that firms alter their governance needs across their
life-cycle (see Filatotchev et al., 2006; O’Connor and Byrne, 2015). Governance attributes
change and serves different functions as firms evolve. For example, for young,
fast-growing firms, governance fulfils both a resource and strategic role, as firms strive
to fund their expansion using external funds. For larger older firms, the monitoring role
of governance is of primary importance, since these firms no longer require external
capital. In this paper, we focus not on what matters in corporate governance, but
instead endeavour to answer the question of when it matters. On theoretical grounds,
and as already alluded to, there is ample evidence which suggests that governance
potentially valuable for both “immature” and “mature” firms alike. However, the question
of when governance matters the most is not so clear. Thus, we believe that the question of
when governance matters the most remains an open empirical question.
We explore this issue here. We use corporate dividend payout and the ratio of
retained equity to total assets to differentiate between “immature” and “mature” firms
for a sample of 21 emerging market countries. In a series of governance-value
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regressions, we find that governance matters, but only for immature firms. Differences
in the strategic and resource roles of governance result in value differences between
firms, whereas improvements in monitoring, prominent at the latter stages of the life-
cycle are not similarly rewarded.
Given the nature of the governance data that we use, we are cognisant of the fact
that our paper has limitations. Our sample of firms is limited to a small sample of
emerging market firms, observed for just two years. It would be interesting to extend
the sample coverage to a larger number of emerging and developed market firms,
which could potentially be observed over an extended period of time. Our findings
suggest that governance causes value, or more precisely, it is the strategic and
resource functions of governance which creates value for firms. In this paper, there is
no attempt to identify the exact strategic and resource functions which are so
rewarding for young firms. We leave this question to future work. Our findings also
suggest that more emphasis should be placed on examining the governance
attributes of young firms rather than on older firms, where the focus has traditionally
been placed.
Notes
1. Other studies include Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005), Brown and Caylor
(2006), Chi (2005), Black et al. (2006), and Black et al. (2012). See Love (2010) and Bozec and
Bozec (2011) for reviews of this literature.
2. Others explore trends in (aggregate) corporate governance in calendar time (see De Nicola
et al., 2008; Ananchotikul and Eichengreen, 2009). Both show that governance quality has
improved over time. Sawicki (2009) documents improvements in corporate governance
quality in post-Asian crisis Asia. Patel et al. (2002) analyse trends in corporate transparency
and disclosure in emerging markets to the year 2000.
3. Others do include the age of the firm in governance-prediction models (e.g. Black et al.,
2006). However, the age of the firm alone is unlikely to adequately capture differences in life-
cycle stages within and between firms.
4. For a review of the “principal-principal” perspective in emerging markets, see Young et al.
(2008).
5. The findings of Bebchuk et al. (2009) who show that not all of the provisions of the G-Index
matter for firm value suggest that this is the case.
6. Others to use the CLSA data include Mitton (2004), Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and
Kim (2005), and Chen et al. (2009).
7. Market value of debt is proxied using its book value counterpart, and the replacement cost
of assets is proxied using the book value of assets. Book value of debt is calculated as the
book value of total assets less the book value of equity.
8. Since our sample of cross-listing firms is cross-listed in both years of our sample, the
cross-listing variable has no within-firm variation, and as a result, is excluded from the (firm)
fixed effects estimation.
9. De Nicola et al. (2008) and Ananchotikul and Eichengreen (2009) show that, with some
exceptions, governance quality has improved over time.
10. We cluster by firm, but not at a higher-level e.g. country or industry, because where the
number of clusters are small, the standard errors (t-statistics) are biased downwards
(upwards) (see Cameron et al., 2008 for a discussion).
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11. This finding is inconsistent with a large literature which shows that firms soon to cross-list in
the USA are worth more than their non-cross-listing counterparts, and this “value premium”
becomes larger once these firms cross-list (the “cross-listing premium”) (see Doidge et al., 2004,
2009). The evidence with respect to whether a cross-listing in the UK results in a “cross-listing
premium” is mixed. Bianconi and Tan (2009) find that a cross-listing on the main list of the
London Stock Exchange results in a “cross-listing premium”. Doidge et al., 2009 find no such
premium. O’Connor (2009) and Nielsson (2013) document a “cross listing premium” for firms
cross-listed on London’s AIM. Again, Doidge et al. (2009) do not.
12. Bulan and Yan (2009) use a firm’s dividend initiation history as a measure of corporate
life-cycle.
13. Bulan et al. (2007) show that mature firms do not automatically initiate a dividend once
they become mature, but tend to initiate a dividend in times when the dividend premium
is high.
14. Dividend payout is available for all 225 firms but retained equity to total assets for only 202
firms in our final sample. Appendix 2 compares mature and immature firms. Mature firms
are worth more (Tobin’s q), are better governed, more profitable, have positive free cash
flow and cash holdings. What is surprising is that in this sample of firms, immature firms
are larger and have lower growth rates than do mature firms.
15. Firms are designated into one of 13 industries based on the following classifications using
four-digit SIC codes: agriculture and food (0100-0999 & 2000-2111); mining and construction
(1000-1999, excluding 1300-1399); textiles and printing/publishing (2200-2799); chemicals
(2800-2824, 2840-2899); pharmaceuticals (2830-2836); extractive (2900-2999, 1300-1399);
durable manufacturers (3000-3999, excluding 3570-3579); transportation (4000-4899);
utilities (4900-4999); retail (5000-5999); services (7000-8999, excluding 7370-7379); computers
(7370-7379, 3570-3579, 3670-3679); public administration (9000+).
16. In a further set of tests, we confirm these findings. We perform a series of two-stage least
squares regressions, in which we use the yearly industry country specific median values of
governance to instrument for (firm level) corporate governance. This variable is included in
the first stage, but not second-stage (reported in Appendix 3) regression. The idea is that
industry/country specific governance is highly correlated with firm-level governance, but
not correlated with firm value. The coefficient estimates are reported in Appendix 3. Again,
they suggest that governance is only valuable at early life-cycle stages.
17. In unreported analysis, we find that our findings are qualitatively the same when we adjust
retained equity to total assets by industry alone, and when we adjust both retained equity to
total assets and dividend payout by country alone. These findings are available from the
corresponding author upon request.
18. Using cash holdings as a life-cycle proxy is potentially problematic. The traditional view
is that as firms mature their level of cash holdings increases. However, an alternative
view is that corporate cash holdings decrease monotonically over the corporate life-cycle
(see Dittmar and Duchin, 2011), because, amongst others, the firm’s investment
opportunity set diminishes, and presumably the need for cash diminishes too (see Ferreira
and Vilela, 2004).
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Appendix 1
Variable description Summary statistics
Variable Description Source Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum
Tobin’s q Tobin’s q is defined as the
book value of debt plus
market capitalization
divided by the book value
of assets
Worldscope 1.85 1.31 1.42 0.10 9.28
Market to
Book Ratio
The ratio of the market to
book value of assets
Worldscope 2.45 1.68 2.20 0.10 12.42
Corporate
Governance
Equally weighted
composite measure of
management discipline,
transparency,
independence,
accountability,
responsibility, fairness and
social responsibility
Gill (2001,
2002)
58.61 59.40 13.06 93.50 13.90
Retained
Equity
Retained equity to total
assets
Worldscope 0.14 0.11 0.26 (1.26) 0.69
Dividend
Payout
Dividends to total assets Worldscope 0.034 0.020 0.043 0.000 0.199
Capital
Intensity
Property plant and
equipment to sales
Worldscope 1.10 0.61 1.36 0.00 7.45
Leverage Debt to total assets Worldscope 0.47 0.47 0.19 0.04 0.80
Size Log of book assets in US$ Worldscope 6.07 6.13 0.66 3.87 7.47
Growth Logarithmic one-year asset
growth
Worldscope 0.06 0.05 0.22 (0.59) 0.72
EBIT Earnings before interest
and taxation to book assets
Worldscope 0.10 0.10 0.11 (0.37) 0.41
Net Income Net income to assets Worldscope 0.07 0.06 0.09 (0.34) 0.30
Cash
Holdings
Cash holdings to assets Worldscope 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.01 0.59
Cross-
Listing
1 if the firm is cross-listed
in the USA, either as a
Level 1, Level 2, or Rule
144a American Depositary
Receipt (ADR), and 0
otherwise
Bank of
New York,
Citibank,
NYSE, and
Nasdaq.
0.34 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00
Industry
Dummies
Industry dummies based
on primary SIC codes
Worldscope
and Author
Calculations
Country
Dummies
Country dummy for each
country. Argentina is the
reference country
Author
Calculations
Table AI.
Variable description
and summary
statistics
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Appendix 2
Comparisons between average firms
Dividend payout RE/TA
Mature
firms
Immature
firms Difference
mature
firms
Immature
firms Difference
Corporate
governance
60.56 56.71 *** 58.63 58.28
Tobin’s q 2.17 1.54 *** 1.99 1.51 ***
Free cash flow 0.10 (0.03) *** 0.11 (0.05) ***
Dividend payout 0.059 0.009 *** 0.045 0.022 ***
RE/TA 0.314 (0.023) ***
Leverage 0.42 0.53 *** 0.41 0.54 ***
Size 5.98 6.16 *** 6.05 6.19 **
Growth 0.067 0.059 *** 0.08 0.02 ***
EBIT 0.15 0.06 *** 0.13 0.06 ***
Net income 0.10 0.03 *** 0.10 0.03 ***
Cash holdings 0.17 0.12 *** 0.18 0.12 ***
Notes: This table compares the average “mature” to “immature” firm. Maturity is determined using
either dividend payout (industry-adjusted) or retained equity to total assets (RE/TA). All variables are
defined in Appendix 1. “WMedian” and “⩽Median” refer to above and below-median. The column
“difference” refers to the difference between “mature” and “immature” firms, while *,**,***difference
in mean values across each group (two-sided t-test) is significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent,
respectively
Table AII.
Comparison of
mature and
immature firms
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Appendix 3
Corresponding author
Dr Thomas O’Connor can be contacted at: thomas.g.oconnor@nuim.ie
Dividend payout Retained equity to total assets
Full sample
Above median
industry payout
Below median
industry payout Above median Below median
Corporate
governance
0.015
(1.93)*
0.012
(1.05)
0.017
(1.77)*
0.012
(1.29)
0.021
(2.46)**
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Country dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Time dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Controls Included Included Included Included Included
No. observations 450 221 229 192 212
R2 0.524 0.594 0.500 0.625 0.456
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates from the second stage equation from a two-stage least
squares analysis. We instrument for (firm-level) corporate governance using the yearly industry
country specific median values of governance. The instrument is included in the first, but not the
second-stage (reported below) regressions. The sample period is for the years 2001 and 2002. Separate
regressions are estimated for the full sample of firms, and by level of retained equity to total asset
and dividend payout, respectively. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q is calculated as the
book value of debt plus market capitalization divided by the book value of assets. Corporate
governance measures are from CLSA, and are calculated as an equally weighted average of discipline,
transparency, independence, accountability, responsibility, fairness, and social responsibility.
Firm level control variables, defined in the main text, are included (in both first and second-stage
regressions), but not reported. All firm-level data are sourced from Worldscope and information
on firms cross-listing in the USA from Bank of New York-Mellon (www.adrbnymellon.com), and
cross-referenced with data from Citibank (wwss.citissb.com/adr) and JP Morgan (www.adr.com), the
New York Stock Exchange (www.nyse.com), and the NASDAQ (www.nasdaq.com). A full set
of industry, country, and time dummies are included where indicated but not reported. *,**,***Significant at
the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively
Table AIII.
Second-stage
two-stage least
squares estimates
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